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By T. Tony Cai, Yichen Wang, and Linjun Zhang
University of Pennsylvania
Privacy-preserving data analysis is a rising challenge in contem-
porary statistics, as the privacy guarantees of statistical methods
are often achieved at the expense of accuracy. In this paper, we
investigate the tradeoff between statistical accuracy and privacy in
mean estimation and linear regression, under both the classical low-
dimensional and modern high-dimensional settings. A primary focus
is to establish minimax optimality for statistical estimation with the
(ε, δ)-differential privacy constraint. To this end, we find that classical
lower bound arguments fail to yield sharp results, and new technical
tools are called for.
Inspired by the theoretical computer science literature on “trac-
ing adversaries”, we formulate a general lower bound argument for
minimax risks with differential privacy constraints, and apply this
argument to high-dimensional mean estimation and linear regression
problems. We also design computationally efficient algorithms that
attain the minimax lower bounds up to a logarithmic factor. In par-
ticular, for the high-dimensional linear regression, a novel private iter-
ative hard thresholding pursuit algorithm is proposed, based on a pri-
vately truncated version of stochastic gradient descent. The numerical
performance of these algorithms is demonstrated by simulation stud-
ies and applications to real data containing sensitive information, for
which privacy-preserving statistical methods are necessary.
1. Introduction. With the unprecedented availability of datasets con-
taining sensitive personal information, there are increasing concerns that sta-
tistical analysis of such datasets may compromise individual privacy. These
concerns give rise to statistical methods that provide privacy guarantees
at the cost of statistical accuracy, but there has been very limited under-
standing of the optimal tradeoff between accuracy and privacy for many
important statistical problems that we shall investigate in this paper.
A rigorous definition of privacy is a prerequisite for such an understand-
ing. Differential privacy, introduced in Dwork et al. [12], is arguably the
most widely adopted definition of privacy in statistical data analysis. The
promise of a differentially private algorithm is protection of any individ-
∗The research was supported in part by NSF grant DMS-1712735 and NIH grants
R01-GM129781 and R01-GM123056.
MSC 2010 subject classifications: Primary 62F30; secondary 62F12, 62J05
Keywords and phrases: High-dimensional data; Differential privacy; Mean estimation;
Linear regression; Minimax optimality
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
04
49
5v
2 
 [s
tat
.M
L]
  1
3 A
ug
 20
19
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ual’s privacy from an adversary who has access to the algorithm output and
even sometimes the rest of the data. Differential privacy has gained signifi-
cant attention in the machine learning communities over the past few years
[13, 1, 16, 10] and found its way into real world applications developed by
Google [18], Apple [6], Microsoft [7], and the U.S. Census Bureau [2].
A usual approach to developing differentially private algorithms is per-
turbing the output of non-private algorithms by random noise. When the ob-
servations are continuous, differential privacy can be guaranteed by adding
Laplace/Gaussian noise to the non-private output [13]. For discrete data,
differential privacy can be achieved by adding Gumbel noise to utility score
functions (also known as the exponential mechanism). Naturally, the pro-
cessed output suffers from some loss of accuracy, which has been observed
and studied in the literature, see, for example, Wasserman and Zhou [37],
Smith [31], Lei [24], Bassily et al. [3], Dwork et al. [14]. The goal of this
paper is to provide a quantitative characterization of the tradeoff between
differential privacy guarantees and statistical accuracy, under the statistical
minimax framework. Specifically, we consider this problem for mean esti-
mation and linear regression models in both classical and high-dimensional
settings with (ε, δ)-differential privacy constraint, which is formally defined
as follows.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [12]). A randomized algorithm M is
(ε, δ)-differentially private if and only if for every pair of adjacent datasets
X1:n and X
′
1:n, and for any set S,
P(M(X1:n) ∈ S) ≤ eε · P(M(X ′1:n) ∈ S) + δ,
where we say two datasets X1:n = {xi}ni=1 and X ′1:n = {x′i}ni=1 are adjacent
if and only if
∑n
i=1 1(xi 6= x′i) = 1.
According to the definition, the two parameters ε and δ control the level
of privacy against an adversary who attempts to detect the presence of
a certain subject in the sample. Roughly speaking, ε is an upper bound
on the amount of influence an individual’s record has on the information
released and δ is the probability that this bound fails to hold, so the privacy
constraint becomes more stringent as ε, δ tend to 0.
We establish the necessary cost of privacy by providing minimax risk
lower bounds under the (ε, δ)-differential privacy constraint. To this end, a
key technical tool is presented in Theorem 2.1, which reduces lower bound-
ing the minimax risk to designing a tracing adversary that aims to detect
the presence of an individual in a dataset via the output of a differentially
private procedure that is applied to the dataset. This reduction to tracing
adversaries was first introduced by [4] and [32] to provide sample complexity
lower bounds for attaining a given level of in-sample accuracy.
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To demonstrate the abstract formulation in Theorem 2.1, we apply it to
prove a concrete result, Theorem 2.2, that improved a similar lower bound
in [21] by
√
log(1/δ): when the sample size is n, any (ε, δ)-differentially
private estimator of a d-dimensional sub-Gaussian mean vector must incur
an extra error of at least the order of d
√
log(1/δ)/nε, in addition to the
standard
√
d/n statistical error. The utility of Theorem 2.1 is further shown
in Theorems 3.1, 4.1 and 4.3, for high-dimensional sparse mean estimation
as well as linear regression in both low-dimensional and high-dimensional
settings.
Further, we argue that these necessary costs of privacy, as shown by lower
bounds for the minimax rates, are in fact sharp in both mean estimation
and linear regression problems. We construct efficient algorithms and es-
tablish matching upper bounds up to logarithmic factors. These algorithms
are based on several differentially private subroutines, such as the Gaussian
mechanism, reporting noisy top-k, and their modifications. In particular,
for the high-dimensional linear regression, we propose a novel private iter-
ative hard thresholding pursuit algorithm, based on a privately truncated
version of stochastic gradient descent. Such a private truncation step effec-
tively enforces the sparsity of the resulting estimator and leads to optimal
control of the privacy cost (see more details in Section 4.2). To the best
of our knowledge, these algorithms are the first results achieving the mini-
max optimal rates of convergence in high-dimensional statistical estimation
problems with the (ε, δ)-differential privacy guarantee. Our Theorems 3.1,
3.2, 4.1, and 4.3 together provide matching upper and lower bounds for
both mean estimation and linear regression problems in high-dimensional
and classical settings, up to logarithmic factors.
Related literature. There are previous works studying how the privacy
constraints compromise estimation accuracy. In theoretical computer sci-
ence, [31] showed that under strong conditions on privacy parameters, some
point estimators attain the statistical convergence rates and hence privacy
can be gained for free. [3, 14, 34] proposed differentially private algorithms
for convex empirical risk minimization, principal component analysis, and
high-dimensional regression, and investigated the convergence rates of excess
risk.
The tracing adversary argument for lower bounds originates in the theo-
retical computer science literature [4, 32]. Early works in this direction were
primarily concerned with the accuracy of releasing in-sample quantities, such
as k-way marginals, with differential privacy constraints. Some more recent
works [15, 21] applied the idea to obtain lower bounds for discrete and Gaus-
sian mean estimation. It is well known that theoretical properties of sample
quantities can be very different from those of population parameters (see
more discussions in [8]). In this paper, we build on the existing tracing ad-
versary techniques to formulate a lower bound technique that is applicable to
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general statistical problems, where the estimation of population parameters
is of main interest.
In the statistics community, there has also been a series of works that
studied differential privacy in the context of statistical estimation. [37] ob-
served that, (ε, δ)-local differentially private schemes seem to yield slower
convergence rates than the optimal minimax rates in general; [9] developed a
framework for statistical minimax rates with the α-local privacy constraint;
in addition, [30] showed minimax optimal rates of convergence under α-local
differential privacy and exhibited a mechanism that is minimax optimal for
nearly linear functionals based on randomized response. However, α-local
privacy is a much stronger notion of privacy than (ε, δ)-differential privacy
that is hardly compatible with high-dimensional problems [9]. As we shall see
in this paper, the cost of (ε, δ)-differential privacy in statistical estimation
behaves quite differently compared to that of α-local privacy.
Organization of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes a general technical tool for lower bounding the minimax
risk with differential privacy constraint. This technical tool is then applied
in Section 3 to the high-dimensional mean estimation problem. Both mini-
max lower bound and algorithm with matching upper bounds are obtained.
Section 4 further applies the general lower bound technique to investigate
the minimax lower bounds of the linear regression problem with differential
privacy constraint, in both low-dimensional and high-dimensional settings.
The upper bounds are also obtained by providing novel differentially pri-
vate algorithms and analyzing their risks. The results together show that
our bounds are rate-optimal up to logarithmic factors. Simulation studies
are carried out in Section 5 to show the advantages of our proposed algo-
rithms. Section 6 applies our algorithms to real data sets with potentially
sensitive information that warrants privacy-preserving methods. Section 7
discusses extensions to other statistical estimation problems with privacy
constraints. The proofs are given in Section 8.
Definitions and notation. We conclude this section by introducing no-
tations that will be used in the rest of the paper. For a positive integer n,
[n] denotes the set {1, 2, ..., n}. For a vector x ∈ Rd, we use ‖x‖0, ‖x‖p =
(
∑
j∈[d] x
p
j )
1/p and ‖x‖∞ = maxj∈[d] |xj | to denote the usual vector `0, `p
and `∞ norm, respectively, where the `0 norm counts the number of nonzero
entries in a vector. For any set A ⊆ [d] and v ∈ Rd, let vA denote the |A|-
dimensional vector consisting of vi such that i ∈ A. The Frobenius norm
of a matrix Ω = (ωij) is denoted by ‖Ω‖F =
√∑
i,j ω
2
ij , and the spectral
norm of Ω is ‖Ω‖2. In addition, we use λmin, λmax to denote the smallest and
the largest eigenvalues of Ω. The matrix `0 norm is defined similarly as the
vector `0 norm, i.e. ‖Ω‖0 = #{(i, j) : ωij 6= 0}. In addition, |Ω| denotes the
determinant of Ω. The empirical measure is denoted by En = n−1
∑n
i=1 δxi
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for a sample x1, . . . ,xn. For a set A, we use A
c to denote its complement,
and 1(A) denotes the indicator function on A. We use C, C1, C2, ..., and
c1, c2, ... to denote generic constants which may vary line by line.
2. A General Lower Bound for Minimax Risk with Differential
Privacy. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 present a general minimax lower bound tech-
nique for statistical estimation problems with differential privacy constraint.
As an application, we use this technique to establish a tight lower bound for
differentially private mean estimation in Section 2.3.
The lower bound technique is based on a tracing adversary that attempts
to detect the presence of an individual data entry in a data set with the
knowledge of an estimator computed from the data set. If one can construct
a tracing adversary that is effective at this task given an accurate estima-
tor, an argument by contradiction leads to a lower bound of the accuracy
of differentially private estimators: suppose a differentially private estimator
from a data set is sufficiently accurate, the tracing adversary will be able
to determine the presence of an individual data entry in the data set, thus
contradicting with the differential privacy guarantee. In other words, the
privacy guarantee and the tracing adversary together ensure that a differ-
entially private estimator cannot be “too accurate”.
This tracing adversary argument, originally proposed by [4], has proven
to be a powerful tool for obtaining lower bounds in the context of releasing
sample quantities [32, 33] and for Gaussian mean estimation [21]. We shall
refine the tracing adversary argument to formulate a minimax lower bound
technique that will be applied to a series of statistical estimation problems
later in the paper.
2.1. Background and problem formulation. Let P denote a family of dis-
tributions supported on a set X , and let θ : P → Θ ⊂ Rd denote a popula-
tion quantity of interest. The statistician has access to a data set of n i.i.d.
samples, X = (x1, ...,xn) ∈ X n, drawn from a statistical model P ∈ P.
With the data, our goal is to estimate a population parameter θ(P ) by an
estimator M(X) : X n → Θ that belongs toMε,δ, the collection of all (ε, δ)-
differentially private procedures. The performance of M(X) is measured
by its distance to the truth θ(P ): formally, let ρ : Θ × Θ → R+ be a
metric induced by a norm ‖ · ‖ on Θ, namely ρ(θ1,θ2) = ‖θ1 − θ2‖, and let
l : R+ → R+ be a loss function that is monotonically increasing on R+, this
paper studies the minimax risk for differentially-private estimation of the
population parameter θ(P ):
inf
M∈Mε,δ
sup
P∈P
E [l(ρ(M(X),θ(P )))] .
In this paper, our setting of the privacy parameters are ε = O(1) and
δ = o(1/n). This is essentially the most-permissive setting under which
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(ε, δ)-differential privacy is a nontrivial guarantee: [32] shows that δ < 1/n
is essentially the weakest privacy guarantee that is still meaningful.
2.2. Lower bound by tracing. Consider a tracing adversaryAP (x,M(X)) :
X × Θ → {IN,OUT} that outputs IN if it determines a certain sample x
is in the data set X after seeing M(X), and outputs OUT otherwise. We
define T R(X,M(X)) := {i ∈ [n] : AP (xi,M(X)) = IN}, the index set of
samples that are determined as IN by the adversary AP . A survey of tracing
adversaries and their relationship with differential privacy can be found in
[16] and the reference therein.
Our general lower bound technique requires some regularity conditions
for P and θ : P → Θ ⊂ Rd: for every P ∈ P, we assume that there
exists a P0 ∈ P such that for every α ∈ [0, 1], (1 − α)P0 + αP ∈ P, and
θ ((1− α)P0 + αP ) = αθ(P ). The two statistical problems investigated in
this paper, mean estimation and linear regression, satisfy the property.
The following theorem shows that minimax lower bounds for statistical
estimation problems with privacy constraint can be constructed if there exist
effective tracing adversaries:
Theorem 2.1. Suppose X = {x1, ...,xn} is an i.i.d. sample from a
distribution P ∈ P, and assume that P and θ satisfy the regularity conditions
described above. If there is a tracing adversary AP (x,M(X)) that satisfies
the following two properties when n . ψ(P, δ),
1. completeness: P({T R(X,M(X)) = ∅}∩{ρ(M(X),θ(P )) . λ(P, δ)}) ≤
δ,
2. soundness: P(AP (xi,M(X ′i)) = IN) ≤ δ, where X ′i is an adjacent
dataset of X with xi replaced by x
′
i ∼ P ,
then if ε = O(1), n−1e−3εn/2 ≤ δ ≤ n−(1+τ) for some τ > 0, and n &
ψ(P, δ) log(1/δ)/ε, we have
inf
M∈Mε,δ
sup
P∈P
E [l (ρ(M(X),θ(P )))] & l
(
ψ(P, δ) · λ(P, δ) · log(1/δ)
nε
)
.
The connection between the tracing adversary and lower bounds Com-
pleteness and soundness roughly correspond to “true positive” and “false
positive” in classification: completeness requires the adversary to return
some nontrivial result when its input M(X) is accurate; soundness guar-
antees that an individual is unlikely to be identified as IN if the estimator
that AP used is independent of the individual. When a tracing adversary
satisfies these properties, Theorem 2.1 conveniently leads to a minimax risk
lower bound; that is, Theorem 2.1 is a reduction from constructing minimax
risk lower bounds to finding complete and sound tracing adversaries.
The connection between tracing attacks and minimax lower bounds has a
long history in differential privacy community [4, 15, 32]. While prior works
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primarily focused on the application of k-way marginals, here we provide
a statement for more general statistical estimation problems with improved
convergence rate. In the next section, we illustrate this technique by proving
a minimax risk lower bound with privacy constraint for the classical mean
estimation problem.
2.3. A first application: private mean estimation in the classical setting.
Consider the d-dimensional sub-Gaussian distribution family P(σ, d), de-
fined as
P(σ, d) =
{
P
∣∣∣Ex∼P [eλe>k (x−µP )] ≤ eσ2λ2/2, ∀λ ∈ R, k ∈ [d]} ,
where µP = EP [x] ∈ Rd is the mean of P , and ek denotes the kth standard
basis vector of Rd.
Following the notation introduced in Section 2.1, X = Rd and θ(P ) = µP .
Further we take l(t) = t and ρ(θ,θ′) = ‖θ − θ′‖2, so that our risk function
is simply the `2 error. The minimax risk is then denoted by
inf
M(X)∈Mε,δ
sup
P∈P(σ,d)
E [‖M(X)− µP ‖2] .
Consider the tracing adversary:
AP (x,M(X)) =
{
IN 〈x− x˜,M(X)〉 > σ2√8d log(1/δ),
OUT otherwise,
where x˜ is a fresh independent draw from P . The adversary is indeed com-
plete and sound, as desired:
Lemma 2.3.1. If n .
√
d/ log(1/δ), there is a distribution P ∈ P(σ, d)
such that
1. P({T R(X,M(X)) = ∅} ∩ {‖M(X)− µP ‖2 . σ
√
d}) ≤ δ,
2. P(AP (xi,M(X ′i) = IN)) ≤ δ, where X ′i is an adjacent dataset of X
with xi replaced by x
′
i ∼ P .
Intuitively, this adversary is constructed as follows. Without privacy con-
straints, a natural estimator for µP is the sample mean M(X) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 xi.
On one hand, when x does not belong to X = {xi}ni=1, 〈x − x˜,M(X)〉 is
a sum of d independent zero-mean random variables and we have E[〈x −
x˜,M(X)〉] = 0. On the other hand, when x belongs to X, we will have
E[〈x − x˜,M(X)〉] = E[ 1n‖x‖22] > 0, and AP (x,M(X)) is more likely to
output IN than OUT.
In view of Theorem 2.1, λ(P, δ) = σ√d and ψ(P, δ) = √d/ log(1/δ); it
follows that
inf
M∈Mε,δ
sup
P∈P(σ,d)
EP [‖M(X)− µP ‖2] = σd
√
log(1/δ)
nε
.
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Combining with the well-known statistical minimax lower bound (see for
example, [23]),
inf
M
sup
P∈P(σ,d)
E [‖M(X)− µP ‖2] & σ
√
d
n
,
we arrive at the minimax lower bound result for differentially private mean
estimation.
Theorem 2.2. Let Mε,δ denote the collection of all (ε, δ)-differentially
private algorithms, and let X = (x1,x2, · · · ,xn) be an i.i.d. sample drawn
from P ∈ P(σ, d). Suppose that ε = O(1), n−1e−3εn/2 ≤ δ ≤ n−(1+τ) for
some τ > 0 and
√
d log(1/δ)
nε = O(1), then
inf
M∈Mε,δ
sup
P∈P(σ,d)
E [‖M(X)− µP ‖2] & σ
(√
d
n
+
d
√
log(1/δ)
nε
)
.
Remark 1. The minimax lower bound characterizes the cost of privacy
in the mean estimation problem: the cost of privacy dominates the statistical
risk when
√
d log(1/δ)/
√
nε & 1.
Remark 2. This minimax lower bound matches the sample complexity
lower bound in [15], which considered the deterministic worst case instead
of the i.i.d. statistical setting. [21] studied Gaussian mean estimation but
did not obtain a tight bound with respect to δ.
3. Privacy Cost of High-dimensional Mean Estimation. In this
section and the subsequent Section 4, we consider the high-dimensional set-
ting where d & n and the population parameters of interest, such as the mean
vector µP or the regression coefficient β, are sparse. In each statistical prob-
lem investigated, we present a minimax risk lower bound with differential
privacy constraint, as well as a procedure with differential privacy guarantee
that attains the lower bound up to factor(s) of log n.
3.1. Private high-dimensional mean estimation. We first consider the
problem of estimating the sparse mean vector µP of a d-dimensional sub-
Gaussian distribution, where d can possibly be much larger than the sample
size n. We denote the parameter space of interest by
P(σ, d, s) =
{
P
∣∣∣EP [eλe>k (x−µP )] ≤ eσ2λ2/2, ∀λ ∈ R, k ∈ [d]; ‖µP ‖0 ≤ s} ,
where the sparsity level is controlled by the parameter s.
For sparse statistical models, the design and analysis of tracing adversaries
is closely connected to the problem of differentially-private selection, as we
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would like to characterize the difficulty of selecting the index set of non-zero
coordinates of µP . For more background on differentially-private selection,
we refer interested readers to [33] and the reference therein.
Let us consider the tracing adversary proposed by [33]:
AP (x,M(X)) =
{
IN
∑
j:j∈S(M(X))(xj − x˜j) > σ
√
8s log(1/δ),
OUT otherwise,
where x˜ is an independent draw from P , and
S(M(X)) := {j ∈ [d] : M(X)j is among the top s largest coordinates of M(X)} .
Given M(X) computed from a data set X, this tracing adversary at-
tempts to identify whether an individual x belongs to X, by calculating the
difference of
∑
j xj and
∑
j x˜j over those coordinates j where M(X) has a
large value. If x belongs to X, the former should be correlated with M(X)
and is likely to be larger than the latter.
Formally, the tracing adversary is complete and sound under appropriate
sample size constraint:
Lemma 3.1.1. If n .
√
s/ log(1/δ) log(d/s), there is a distribution P ∈
P(σ, d, s) such that
1. P({T R(X,M(X)) = ∅} ∩ {‖M(X)− µP ‖2 . σ
√
s}) ≤ δ,
2. P(AP (xi,M(X ′i)) = IN) ≤ δ, where X ′i is an adjacent data set of X
with xi replaced by x
′
i ∼ P .
In conjunction with our general lower bound result Theorem 2.1, we have
Theorem 3.1. Let Mε,δ denote the collection of all (ε, δ)-differentially
private algorithms, and let X = (x1,x2, · · · ,xn) be an i.i.d. sample drawn
from P ∈ P(σ, d, s). Suppose that ε = O(1), n−1e−3εn/2 ≤ δ ≤ n−(1+τ) for
some τ > 0, and
√
s log(1/δ) log(d/s)
nε = O(1), then
inf
M∈Mε,δ
sup
P∈P(σ,d,s)
E [‖M(X)− µP ‖2] & σ
(√
s log d
n
+
s log(d/s)
√
log(1/δ)
nε
)
.
The first term is the statistical minimax lower bound of sparse mean
estimation (see, for example, [20]), and the second term is due to the privacy
constraint. Comparing the two terms shows that, in high-dimensional sparse
mean estimation, the cost of differential privacy is significant when√
s log(1/δ)/ log d log(d/s)√
nε
& 1.
In the next section, we present a differentially private procedure that
attains this convergence rate up to a logarithmic factor.
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3.2. Rate-optimal procedures. The rate-optimal algorithms in this paper
utilize some classical subroutines in the differential privacy literature, such
as the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms and reporting the noisy maximum
of a vector. Before describing our rate-optimal algorithms in detail, it is
helpful to review some relevant results, which will also serve as the building
blocks of the differentially private linear regression methods in Section 4.
3.2.1. Basic differentially private procedures. It is frequently the case
that differential privacy can be attained by adding properly scaled noises to
the output of a non-private algorithm. Among the most prominent examples
are the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms.
The Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms. As the name suggests, the Laplace
and Gaussian mechanisms achieve differential privacy by perturbing an al-
gorithm with Laplace and Gaussian noises respectively. The scale of such
noises is determined by the sensitivity of the algorithm:
Definition 2. For any algorithm f mapping a dataset X to Rd, The
Lp-sensitivity of f is
∆p(f) = sup
X,X′ adjacent
‖f(X)− f(X ′)‖p.
For algorithms with finite L1-sensitivity, the differential privacy guarantee
can be attained by adding noises sampled from a Laplace distribution.
Lemma 3.2.1 (The Laplace mechanism [13]). For any algorithm f map-
ping a dataset to Rd such that ∆1(f) < ∞, the Laplace mechanism, given
by
M1(X, f, ε) := f(X) + (ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξd)
where ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξd is an i.i.d. sample drawn from Laplace(∆1f/ε), achieves
(ε, 0)-differential privacy.
Similarly, adding Gaussian noises to algorithms with finite L2-sensitivity
guarantees differential privacy.
Lemma 3.2.2 (The Gaussian mechanism [13]). For any algorithm f map-
ping a dataset to Rd such that ∆2(f) <∞, the Gaussian mechanism, given
by
M2(X, f, ε) := f(X) + (ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξd)
where ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξk is an i.i.d. sample drawn from N{0, 2(∆2f/ε)2 log(1.25/δ)},
achieves (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
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An important application of these mechanisms is differentially private se-
lection of the maximum/minimum, which also plays a crucial role in our
high-dimensional mean estimation algorithm. Next we review some algo-
rithms for differentially private selection, to provide some concrete examples
and prepare us for stating the main algorithms.
Differentially private selection. Selecting the maximum (in absolute value)
coordinate of f(x) := f(x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈ Rd is a straightforward applica-
tion of the Laplace mechanism, as follows:
Algorithm 1: PrivateMax(f(x), B, ε):
1: Sample ξ1, · · · , ξd i.i.d.∼ Laplace(2B/ε).
2: For i ∈ [d], compute the noisy version ∣∣fi(x)∣∣+ ξi.
3: Return imax = arg maxj |fj(x) + ξj | and fimax(x) + w, where w is an
independent draw from Laplace(2B/ε).
Lemma 3.2.3 ([17]). If supx,x′adjacent ‖f(x) − f(x′)‖∞ ≤ B, then Pri-
vateMax (f(x), B, ε) is (ε, 0)-differentially private.
In applications, we are often interested in finding the top-k numbers with
k > 1. There are two methods for this task: an iterative “Peeling” algorithm
that runs the PrivateMax algorithm k times, with appropriately chosen pri-
vacy parameters in each iteration.
Algorithm 2: Peeling(f(x), k, B, ε, δ):
1: Set z = f(x).
2: for j = 1 to k do
3: Run PrivateMax
(
z, B, ε
2
√
3k log(1/δ)
)
to obtain (ij , fij (x) + w
′
j).
4: Remove fij (x) from z.
5: end for
6: Report the k selected pairs.
Lemma 3.2.4 ([17]). If supx,x′adjacent ‖f(x)−f(x′)‖∞ ≤ B, then Peeling
(x, k, B, ε, δ) is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
With these differentially private selection subroutine, we are ready to
present the high-dimensional mean estimation algorithm in the next section.
3.2.2. Differentially-private mean estimation in high dimensions. Let fT (·)
denote projection onto the `∞ ball of radius T > 0 in Rd, where T is a tun-
ing parameter for the truncation level. With suitably chosen T , the following
algorithm attains the minimax lower bound in Theorem 3.1, up to at most
a logarithmic factor in n.
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Algorithm 3: Private High-dimensional Mean Estimation
1: Compute µˆT =
1
n
∑n
i=1 fT (Xi)
2: Find the top sˆ components of µˆT by running Peeling (µT , sˆ, 2T/n, ε, δ)
and set the remaining components to 0. Denote the resulting vector by
µˆT,sˆ.
3: Return µˆT,sˆ.
In view of Theorem 3.1, the theorem below shows that the high-dimensional
mean estimation algorithm is rate-optimal up to a factor of
√
log n.
Theorem 3.2. For X1, X2, · · · , Xn ∼ P ∈ P(σ, d, s) with EPX = µ,
if ‖µ‖∞ = O(1) sˆ  s and sˆ > s, then Algorithm 3 is (ε, δ)-differentially
private, and
1. if there exists a constant M <∞ such that P(‖X‖∞ < M) = 1, when
T ≥M ,
E‖µˆT,sˆ − µ‖2 . σ
(√
s log d
n
+
s log d
√
log(1/δ)
nε
)
;
2. otherwise, with the choice of T ≥ Cσ√log n for a sufficiently large
constant C > 0,
E‖µˆT,sˆ − µ‖2 . σ
(√
s log d
n
+
s log d
√
log(1/δ) log n
nε
)
.
Remark 3. [9] introduced the notion of α-local privacy and shows that
high-dimensional estimation is effectively impossible with α-local privacy
constraint. In contrast, Theorem 3.2 shows that sparse mean estimation is
still possible with (ε, δ)-differential privacy constraint.
Remark 4. The truncation parameter T serves to control the sensitivity
of the sample mean so that the Laplace/Gaussian mechanisms apply. T can
be replaced by a differentially-private estimator that consistently estimates
the sample’s range (see [24] and [22]).
3.2.3. Differentially private algorithms in the classical setting. In the
classical setting of d  n, the optimal rate of convergence of the mean
estimation problem can be achieved simply by a noisy, truncated sample
mean: given an i.i.d. sample X1, X2, · · · , Xn, the estimator is defined as
µˆT :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
fT (Xi) +W,
where fT (·) denotes projection onto the L∞ ball of radius T > 0 in Rd, and
W is an independent draw from Nd
(
0, dT
2 log(1.25/δ)
n2ε2
Id
)
. The theoretical
guarantees for this estimator are summarized in the theorem below.
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Theorem 3.3. For an i.i.d. sample X1, X2, · · · , Xn ∼ P ∈ P(σ, d) with
EPX = µ satisfying ‖µ‖∞ = O(1), µˆT is an (ε, δ)-differentially private
procedure, and:
1. if there exists a constant M <∞ such that P(‖X‖∞ < M) = 1, when
T ≥M ,
E‖µˆT − µ‖2 . σ
(√
d
n
+
d
√
log(1/δ)
nε
)
;
2. otherwise, with the choice of T ≥ Cσ√log n for a sufficiently large
constant C > 0,
E‖µˆT − µ‖2 . σ
(√
d
n
+
d
√
log(1/δ) log n
nε
)
.
By comparing with Theorem 2.2, we see that the noisy truncated sample
mean achieves the optimal rate of convergence up to a factor of
√
log n.
4. Privacy Cost of Linear Regression. In this section, we inves-
tigate the cost of differential privacy in linear regression problems, with
primary focus on the high-dimensional setting where d & n and the re-
gression coefficient β is assumed to be sparse; the classical, low-dimensional
case (d  n) will also be covered. Through the general lower bound tech-
nique described in Section 2, we are able to establish minimax lower bounds
that match the minimax rate of our differentially private procedures up to
factor(s) of log n.
4.1. Lower bound of high-dimensional linear regression. For high-dimensional
sparse linear regression, we consider the following distribution space
PX,Y (σ, d, s)
= {P (x, y) | ‖x‖∞ . 1,  := y − x>β ∼ P ∈ P(σ, 1), ‖β‖0 ≤ s, ‖β‖2 ≤ C},
where the parameter of interest is β = E[x>x]−1E[x>y] ∈ Rd is defined such
that Xβ is the best linear approximation of y, and C is a generic constant.
For brevity, we use P to denote P (x, y).
Let D = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 denote an i.i.d. sample drawn from some P ∈
PX,Y (σ, d, s), we propose the tracing adversary
AP ((x, y),M(D)) =
{
IN
∑
j∈S(M(D)) xj(y − y˜) > σ
√
2s log(1/δ),
OUT otherwise,
where S(M(D)) = {j : M(D)j is among the top s largest coordinates of M(D)},
and y˜ is a fresh independent sample with covariates x.
This adversary satisfies the following properties:
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Lemma 4.1.1. Suppose that ‖M(D) − β‖∞ < σ/2, then when n .√
s/ log(1/δ) log(d/s), there is a distribution P ∈ PX,Y (σ, d, s) such that
1. P({T R(D,M(D)) = ∅} ∩ {‖M(D)− β‖2 . σ
√
s}) ≤ δ,
2. P(AP ((xi, yi),M(D′i)) = IN) . δ, where D′i is an adjacent dataset of
D with (xi, yi) replaced by (x
′
i, y
′
i) ∼ P .
We note that the extra assumption in Lemma 4.1.1 that ‖M(D)−β‖∞ <
σ/2 can be gained “for free”: when it fails to hold, there would be an au-
tomatic lower bound that E‖M(D) − β‖2 & σ. On the other hand, when
‖M(D) − β‖∞ < σ/2, the general lower bound result in Theorem 2.1 is
applicable, and we obtain the following lower bound result.
Theorem 4.1. Let Mε,δ denote the collection of all (ε, δ)-differentially
private algorithms, and suppose the dataset D = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 consists of
i.i.d. entries drawn from PX,Y (σ, d, s). Suppose that ε = O(1), n−1e−3εn/2 ≤
δ ≤ n−(1+τ) for some τ > 0, and
√
s log(1/δ) log(d/s)
nε = O(1), then
inf
M∈Mε,δ
sup
P∈PX,Y (σ,d,s)
E [‖M(D)− β‖2] & σ
(√
s log d
n
+
s log(d/s)
√
log(1/δ)
nε
∧ 1
)
.
Specifically, the second term in the lower bound is a consequence of
Lemma 4.1.1 and Theorem 2.1. The first term is due to the statistical min-
imax lower bound for high-dimensional linear regression (see, for instance,
[29] and [38]).
4.2. Upper bound of high-dimensional linear regression. For high-dimensional
sparse linear regression, we propose the following differentially private LASSO
algorithm, which splits the sample of size n into subsamples of size O(log n)
and iterates through the subsamples by a truncated gradient descent with
random perturbation.
Algorithm 4: Differentially Private LASSO
1: Inputs: privacy parameters δ, ε, deign matrix X,response vector y,
step size η, sparsity tuning parameter sˆ, truncation tuning parameter
T and the number of iterations N0.
2: Randomly split (X,y) into N0 subsets (X(0),y(0)), (X(1),y(1)), · · · ,
(X(N0−1),y(N0−1)) of size n/N0 each.
3: Initialize the algorithm with an sˆ-sparse vector βˆ(0).
4: for t = 0, 1, 2, ..., N0 − 1 do
5: βˆ(t+0.5) = βˆ(t) − η · 1n/N0 (X>(t)X(t)βˆ(t) − X>(t)fT (y(t))), where fT (·)
denotes projection onto the `∞ ball of radius T > 0 in Rd.
6: βˆ(t+1) = Peeling
(
βˆ(t+0.5), sˆ, 4T/(n/N0), ε, δ
)
.
7: end for
8: Output βˆ := βˆ(N0).
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Theorem 4.2. Let (x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · , (xn, yn) be an i.i.d. sample drawn
from P (x, y) ∈ PX,Y (σ, d, s). If we have that
• ΣX , the covariance matrix of x, satisfies 0 < 1/Λ < λmin(ΣX) ≤
λmax(ΣX) < Λ for some constant Λ > 0,
• ‖βˆ(0) − β‖2 ≤ κ‖β‖2 for some κ ∈ (0, 1), and
• the tuning parameters satisfy T ≥ Kσ√log n for a sufficiently large
constant K > 0, N0  log n, sˆ  s and for ρ := λmax(ΣX)−λmin(ΣX)λmax(ΣX)+λmin(ΣX) , it
holds that
sˆ ≥ max
{
4(1 + κ)2
(1− κ)2 ,
(
4ρ
1− ρ
)2}
s
then βˆ is (ε, δ)-differentially private, and it holds with high probability that
‖βˆ − β‖2 . σ
(√
s log d log n
n
+
s
√
log(1/δ)
nε
log d · log3/2 n
)
.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first differentially private LASSO
algorithm that attains the optimal convergence rate (up to a logarithm term
log3/2 n), by comparing with Theorem 4.1.
4.3. Linear regression in the classical setting. In the classical linear re-
gression problem, we have i.i.d. observations D = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 drawn from
some P that belongs to the distribution space
PX,Y (σ, d) = {P (x, y) | ‖x‖∞ . 1,  := y−x>β ∼ P ∈ P(σ, 1), ‖β‖2 ≤ C},
where the parameter of interest is β = E[x>x]−1E[x>y] ∈ Rd is defined such
that Xβ is the best linear approximation of y, and C is a generic constant.
To apply Theorem 2.1 to deriving the lower bound for the linear regression
model, we consider the following tracing adversary:
AP ((x, y),M(D)) =
{
IN 〈xy − xy˜,M(D)〉 > σ2√8d log(1/δ),
OUT otherwise,
where y˜ is a fresh independent draw with the same covariates x as y.
The next lemma summarizes the soundness and completeness properties
of the tracing adversary.
Lemma 4.3.1. If n .
√
d/ log(1/δ) and ‖M(D) − β‖∞ ≤ σ/2, there is
a distribution P ∈ PX,Y (σ, d), such that
1. P({T R(D,M(D)) = ∅} ∩ {‖M(D)− β‖2 . σ
√
d}) ≤ δ,
2. P(AP ((xi, yi),M(D′i) = IN)) ≤ δ, where D′i is an adjacent dataset of
D with (xi, yi) replaced by (x
′
i, y
′
i) ∼ P .
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As in the high-dimensional setting, the extra assumption in this lemma
that ‖M(D)− β‖∞ < σ/2 can be gained “for free”.
Our minimax lower bound for private linear regression in the classical
setting is presented in the theorem below:
Theorem 4.3. Let Mε,δ denote the collection of all (ε, δ)-differentially
private algorithms, and suppose that ε = O(1), n−1e−3εn/2 ≤ δ ≤ n−(1+τ)
for some τ > 0 and
√
d log(1/δ)
nε = O(1), then
inf
M∈Mε,δ
sup
P∈PX,Y (σ,d)
E [‖M(D)− β‖2] & σ
(√
d
n
+
d
√
log(1/δ)
nε
∧ 1
)
.
Similar to the other lower bound results, the two terms in this minimax
lower bound correspond to the statistical risk and the risk due to privacy
constraint respectively.
4.3.1. Differentially private algorithms in the classical setting. In the
classical setting of d  n, the optimal rate of convergence for differen-
tially private linear regression can be directly achieved by perturbing the
OLS estimator with suitably chosen noises.
Let βˆ = βˆ(X,y) := (X>X)−1X>y denote the OLS estimator, we con-
sider the noisy estimator
βˆT := βˆ(X, fT (y)) +W,
where fT (·) denotes projection onto the `∞ ball of radius T > 0 in Rd, and
W is an independent draw from Nd
(
0, dT
2 log(1.25/δ)
n2ε2
Id
)
.
Theorem 4.4. Let (x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · , (xn, yn) be an i.i.d. sample drawn
from P (x, y) ∈ PX,Y (σ, d). If we have that
• ΣX , the covariance matrix of x, satisfies 0 < 1/Λ < λmin(ΣX) ≤
λmax(ΣX) < Λ for some constant Λ > 0, and
• T ≥ Kσ√log n for a sufficiently large constant K > 0,
then with high probability, βˆT is (ε, δ)-differentially private, and
E‖βˆT − β‖2 . σ
(√
d
n
+
d
√
log(1/δ) log n
nε
)
.
This risk upper bound shows that the lower bound in Theorem 4.3 is
optimal up to a factor of
√
log n.
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5. Simulation Studies. The proposed private algorithms can be im-
plemented efficiently. In this section, we perform simulation studies of these
algorithms to demonstrate the cost of privacy in different statistical esti-
mation schemes, as well as the merits of the proposed algorithms. More
specifically, we study the following four different problems.
Conventional mean estimation The data x1, ...,xn is an i.i.d. sample
drawn from Nd(µ, σ
2Id), where µ1 = ... = µd = 1 and σ = 0.5.
High-dimensional mean estimation The data x1, ...,xn is an i.i.d. sam-
ple drawn from Nd(µ, σ
2Id), where σ = 0.5 and µ is an s-sparse vector
with the first s entries being 1 and the rest being 0.
Conventional linear regression The data (x1, y1), ..., (xn, yn) are gener-
ated from the model y = Xβ + . In the simulation, the entries of
design matrix are independently generated from Bernoulli(0.15), and
1, ...n is an i.i.d sample from N(0, σ
2) with σ = 0.5. The coefficients
β is set to β1 = ... = βd = 1.
High-dimensional linear regression The data (x1, y1), ..., (xn, yn) are
generated from the model y = Xβ+. In the simulation, we set σ = 0.5
and the design matrix is generated the same way as in the conventional
setting. The coefficients β is set to be s-sparse with β1 = ... = βs = 1,
and the rest are set to 0.
In all simulations, the privacy parameters (ε, δ) take values among (0.5, 0.5),
(0.5, 0.1), (0.5, 0.01), (0.2, 0.01), and (0.2, 0.001). In the low-dimensional
problems, sample size and dimension (n, d) take values among (10000, 50),
(50000, 50), (10000, 100) to (50000, 100); in the high-dimensional problems,
sample size, dimension and sparsity (n, d, s) take values among (2000, 2000, 20),
(4000, 2000, 20), (2000, 4000, 20), (4000, 4000, 20), (2000, 2000, 30), (4000, 2000,
30), (2000, 4000, 30), and (4000, 4000, 30).
In these simulation studies, we also compare the performance of (ε, δ)-
differentially private methods with the optimal mechanisms under α-local
differential privacy proposed in [9], where we set the local privacy param-
eter to be α = 10, corresponding to a weak local privacy constraint. As
there is no high-dimensional linear regression algorithms with α-local dif-
ferential privacy in [9], we compare our algorithm with the locally private
(low-dimensoinal) linear regression algorithm proposed in [9]. The locally
private linear regression algorithm is implemented with the knowledge of
β’s support, which is not usually available in applications.
Tables 1-4 summarize the estimation errors with respect to `2 error (‖µˆ−
µ‖2 in mean estimation problems and ‖βˆ − β‖2 in regression problems)
for various methods. In the tables, NP, DP, LDP stand for the non-private
algorithms, differentially private algorithms, and locally differentially private
algorithms respectively. Each estimation error reported is the average over
100 replications of a given method; the standard error of each case is reported
in parentheses.
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Table 1
Conventional Mean Estimation
NP DP LDP
(n, d) (.5, .5) (.5, .1) (.5, .01) (.2, .01) (.2, .001) α = 10
(10000,50) .014(.001) .050(.007) .084(.011) .115(.012) .311(.043) .367(.058) 5.435(.507)
(50000,50) .006(.001) .011(.001) .018(.002) .025(.004) .063(.010) .074(.010) 4.260(.213)
(10000,100) .020(.001) .095(.001) .168(.020) .240(.026) .591(.073) .741(.088) 9.523(.645)
(50000,100) .009(.001) .020(.002) .035(.003) .050(.005) .121(.013) .150(.015) 5.411(.201)
Table 2
High-dimensional Mean Estimation
NP DP LDP
(n, d, s) (.5, .5) (.5, .1) (.5, .01) (.2, .01) (.2, .001) α = 10
(2000,2000,20) .154(.010) .179(.024) .277(.059) .380(.074) .882(.162) 1.173(.271) 309.999(1.504)
(4000,2000,20) .110(.005) .121(.015) .155(.025) .172(.027) .452(.100) .549(.102) 218.269(1.805)
(2000,4000,20) .162(.009) .183(.024) .276(.044) .361(.085) .860(.164) 1.537(.412) 613.808(4.187)
(4000,4000,20) .117(.006) .124(.017) .143(.023) .191(.035) .459(.083) .524(.091) 432.422(3.070)
(2000,2000,30) .154(.007) .206(.029) .347(.049) .464(.085) 1.195(.204) 2.097(.405) 311.486(2.556)
(4000,2000,30) .110(.006) .135(.020) .178(.027) .238(.034) .578(.101) .749(.180) 220.502(1.761)
(2000,4000,30) .166(.008) .227(.030) .361(.074) .466(.092) 1.388(.302) 2.931(.496) 613.703(4.272)
(4000,4000,30) .117(.007) .136(.199) .182(.0259) .245(.043) .600(.107) .731(.122) 439.823(1.533)
Table 3
Conventional Linear Regression
NP DP LDP
(n, d) (.5, .5) (.5, .1) (.5,.01) (.2, .01) (.2, .001) α = 10
(10000,50) .061(.014) .111(.017) .179(.028) .233(.042) .624(.108) .747(.109) 85.394(5.441)
(50000,50) .030(.006) .032(.005) .044(.006) .056(.008) .120(.020) .148(.018) 58.412(5.511)
(10000,100) .087(.012) .206(.022) .350(.039) .499(.045) 1.200(.126) 1.508(.133) 297.885(13.325)
(50000,100) .041(.006) .055(.006) .079(.008) .102(.010) .245(.026) .294(.028) 250.424(17.333)
Table 4
High-dimensional Linear Regression
NP DP LDP
(n, d, s) (.5, .5) (.5, .1) (.5, .01) (.2, .01) (.2, .001) α = 10
(2000,2000,20) .032(.006) .033(.004) .052(.006) .076(.010) .176(.023) .233(.024) 19.278(1.518)
(4000,2000,20) .022(.002) .022(.003) .035(.006) .043(.007) .099(.013) .110(.023) 18.730(1.741)
(2000,4000,20) .033(.005) .034(.005) .052(.005) .080(.011) .199(.025) .206(.190) 18.899(2.239)
(4000,4000,20) .022(.003) .023(.004) .034(.004) .038(.005) .096(.011) .118(.013) 18.797(2.098)
(2000,2000,30) .037(.006) .037(.007) .058(.006) .104(.012) .239(.038) .283(.032) 38.918(3.224)
(4000,2000,30) .026(.004) .027(.004) .035(.004) .053(.005) .118(.016) .130(.021) 34.552(1.982)
(2000,4000,30) .039(.004) .040(.005) .061(.006) .104(.014) .238(.038) .308(.028) 36.124(3.361)
(4000,4000,30) .027(.003) .028(.003) .035(.005) .055(.005) .116(.023) .147(.018) 32.970(1.947)
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Fig 1: Errors (in log10-scale) plotted against sample size n, with (0.5, 10/n
1.1)-
differentially privacy guarantee. Top-left: conventional mean estimation with sample
size ranging from 1000 to 1000× 20; top-right: conventional linear regression with
sample size ranging from 1000 to 1000 × 20; bottom-left: high-dimensional mean
estimation with sample size ranging from 200 to 200 × 20; bottom-right: high-
dimensional linear regression with sample size ranging from 200 to 200 × 20. The
local differentially private algorithms (LDP), differentially private (DP) algorithms
and non-private (NP) algorithms are colored in green, red and blue respectively.
As seen in Figure 1 (error in log10-scale), the gap in estimation errors
between the non-private algorithms and differentially private algorithms di-
minishes as the sample size n increases.
6. Data Analysis.
6.1. SNP array of adults with schizophrenia. We analyze the SNP array
data of adults with schizophrenia, collected by [25], to illustrate the per-
formance of our high-dimensional sparse mean estimator. In the dataset,
there are 387 adults with schizophrenia, 241 of which are labeled as “av-
erage IQ” and 146 of which are labeled as “low IQ”. The SNP array is
obtained by genotyping the subjects with the Affymetrix Genome-Wide Hu-
man SNP 6.0 platform. For our analysis, we focus on the 2000 SNPs with
the highest minor allele frequencies (MAFs); the full dataset is available at
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https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/geo/query/acc.cgi?acc=GSE106818.
Privacy-perserving data analysis is very much relevant for this dataset and
genetic data in general, because as [19] demonstrates, an adversary can infer
the absence/presence of an individual ’s genetic data in a large dataset by
cross-referencing summary statistics, such as MAFs, from multiple genetic
datasets. As MAFs can be easily calculated from the mean of an SNP array,
differentially-private estimators of the mean can effectively allow reporting
the MAFs without compromising any individual’s privacy.
The data set takes the form of a 387 × 2000 matrix. The entries of the
matrix take values 0, 1 or 2, representing the number of minor allele(s) at
each SNP, and therefore the MAF of each SNP location in this sample can
be obtained by computing the mean of the rows in this matrix. Sparsity
is introduced by considering the difference in MAFs of the two IQ groups:
the MAFs of the two groups are likely to differ at a small number of SNP
locations among the 2000 SNPs considered.
For m ranging from 10 to 120, we subsample m subjects from each of
the two IQ groups, say {x11,x12, · · ·x1m} and {x21,x22, · · ·x2m}, and ap-
ply our sparse mean estimator to {x11−x21,x12−x22, · · ·x1m−x2m} with
sˆ = 20 and privacy parameters (ε, δ) = (0.2, n−1.1). The error of this esti-
mator is then calculated by comparing with the mean of the entire sample.
This procedure is repeated 100 times to obtain Figure 2, which displays the
bootstrap estimate of E[‖µˆ − µ‖2]/d as m increases from 10 to 120. The
performance of the sparse mean estimator in [9], with privacy parameter
α = 10, is also plotted for comparison.
Fig 2: The bootstrap estimate of E[‖µˆ − µ‖2]/d for the differentially pri-
vate sparse mean estimator, compared with its locally differentially private
counterpart, as sample size increases from 10 to 120.
6.2. Housing prices in California. For the linear regression problem, we
analyze a housing price dataset with economic and demographic covari-
ates, constructed by [27] and available for download at http://lib.stat.
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cmu.edu/datasets/houses.zip. In this dataset, each subject is a block
group in California in the 1990 Census; there are 20640 block groups in
this dataset. The response variable is the median house value in the block
group; the covariates include the median income, median age, total popu-
lation, number of households, and the total number of rooms of all houses
in the block group. In general, summary statistics such as mean or median
do not have any differential privacy guarantees, so the absence of informa-
tion on individual households in the dataset does not preclude an adversary
from extracting sensitive individual information from the summary statis-
tics. Privacy-preserving methods are still desirable in this case.
For m ranging from 100 to 20600, we subsample m subjects from the
dataset to compute the differentially private OLS estimate, with privacy
parameters (ε, δ) = (0.2, n−1.1). The error of this estimator is then calculated
by comparing with the non-private OLS estimator computed using the entire
sample. This procedure is repeated 100 times to obtain Figure 3, which
displays the trend of the bootstrap estimate of E[‖βˆ−β‖2]/d as m increases
from 100 to 20600. The performance of the linear regression method in [9],
with privacy parameter α = 10, is also plotted for comparison.
Fig 3: The bootstrap estimate of E[‖βˆ−β‖2]/d for the differentially private
OLS estimator, compared with its locally differentially private counterpart,
as sample size increases from 100 to 20600.
7. Discussion. In summary, this paper characterizes the tradeoff be-
tween statistical accuracy and privacy guarantees, by providing information-
theoretic lower bounds for estimation with differential privacy constraint and
differentially private algorithms that has matching upper bounds. For the
lower bounds, as standard packing arguments fail to establish sharp results
under privacy constraints, we have developed a novel lower bound technique
based on tracing adversary. The utility of the new technique is illustrated
by establishing minimax lower bounds for differentially private mean esti-
mation and linear regression, in both low-dimensional and high-dimensional
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settings. We have also proposed computationally efficient algorithms with
matching upper bounds up to logarithmic factors.
This line of work can be extended to designing rate-optimal algorithms
with (ε, δ)-differential privacy guarantee for a greater variety of statistical
problems. For instance, the results in the current paper are applicable to es-
timation of moment-based statistics, such as mean and covariance matrices
estimation. It would also be interesting to generalize the results further to
(high-dimensional) empirical risk minimization, (high-dimensional) classifi-
cation, and nonparametric estimation such as density estimation and non-
parametric regression. We are also interested in studying the statistical cost
of other notions of privacy, such as concentrated differential privacy [11] and
Renyi differential privacy [26]. These notions of privacy have found many
applications such as stochastic gradient Langevian dynamics and stochastic
Monte Carlo sampling [35].
In addition, as we deepen our understanding of statistical estimation prob-
lems with privacy constraints, the next goal should ideally be uncertainty
quantification, i.e. statistical inference, with privacy constraints, which is
largely unexplored in the statistics literature. Notably, [22] established the
optimal length of differentially private confidence intervals for the Gaussian
mean. We hope to investigate the optimal length of private confidence in-
tervals, as well as the optimal power of private hypothesis tests, in a greater
range of problems.
8. Proofs. In this section, we prove the main results, Theorem 2.1,
the general lower bound argument, and Theorem 4.2, the minimax risk up-
per bound of the private high-dimensional linear regression. For reasons of
space, the proofs of other results and technical lemmas are provided in the
supplementary material [5].
8.1. Proof of Theorem 2.1. In this section, we prove Theorem 2.1, the
general approach to obtain lower bound with privacy constraint. The ap-
plications of Theorem 2.1 to different models to obtain lower bounds are
discussed in the supplementary material [5].
The proof of Theorem 2.1 consists of three steps, as follows.
Step 1: A preliminary lower bound. For every (ε, δ)-differentially pri-
vate M , the tracing adversary AP (·,M(X)) that post-processes M is (ε, δ)-
differentially private as well. It follows that for every i ∈ [n],
P (AP (xi,M(X)) = IN) ≤ eε · P
(AP (xi,M(X ′i)) = IN)+ δ ≤ (eε + 1) δ.
Then for T R(X,M(X)) := {i ∈ [n] : AP (xi,M(X)) = IN}, the union
bound leads to
P (T R(X,M(X)) 6= ∅) ≤
∑
i∈[n]
P(AP (xi,M(X)) = IN) ≤ n (eε + 1) δ.
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This inequality and the completeness property together imply that
P(ρ(M(X),θ(P )) . λ(P, δ))
≤ P({T R(X,M(X)) = ∅} ∩ {ρ(M(X),θ(P )) . λ(P, δ)})
+ P(T R(X,M(X)) 6= ∅)
≤ δ + n (eε + 1) δ.
We have δ < n−(1+τ) by assumption, so P(ρ(M(X),θ(P )) . λ(P, δ)) ≤
δ+n (eε + 1) δ is bounded away from 1. Markov’s inequality and the mono-
tonicity of l immediately yield a preliminary lower bound for n . ψ(P, δ):
E[l(ρ(M(X),θ(P ))] & l(λ(P, δ)).
Step 2: An improvement by group privacy. In this step, we show that the
preliminary lower bound found in Step 1 is valid for n . ψ(P, δ) log(1/δ)/ε.
Consider the following construction: let k = C log( 1nδ )/ε and assume that
k divides n without the loss of generality. Since 1ne
−3εn/2 ≤ δ < n−(1+τ), we
have (Cτ/ε) log n < k ≤ n. The value of C is to be specified later.
We first draw an i.i.d. sample of size n/k, denoted by X˜ = {x˜1, x˜2, · · · , x˜n/k},
from P , then sample with replacement from X˜ for n times to obtain X =
{x1,x2, · · · ,xn}. For any M ∈ Mε,δ, we define Mk(X˜) ≡ M(X). Because
M is (ε, δ)-differentially private, Mk is also differentially private, thanks to
the following group privacy lemma:
Lemma 8.1.1 (group privacy, [32]). For every m ≥ 1, if M is (ε, δ)-
differentially private, then for every pair of datasets X = {xk}k and Z =
{zk}k satisfying
∑
k 1(xi 6= zi) ≤ m, and every event S,
PM,X(S) ≤ eεmPM,Z(S) + e
εm − 1
e− 1 · δ.
The group privacy lemma means that, to characterize the privacy param-
eters of Mk, it suffices to upper-bound the number of changes in X incurred
by replacing one element of X˜: let mi denote the number of times that x˜i
appears in a sample of size n drawn with replacement from X˜, then our
quantity of interest here is simply maxi∈[n]mi.
We shall analyze maxi∈[n]mi under two separate scenarios: (1). (1 +
τ) log n ≤ log (1δ ) ≤ (1 + 2τ) log n for some τ > 0, and (2). log (1δ ) 
(1 + τ) log n for all τ > 0.
(1). (1 + τ) log n ≤ log (1δ ) ≤ (1 + 2τ) log n: under this setting, we have
k = C log( 1nδ )/ε  (Cτ/ε) log n. The analysis makes use of a result from
[28], stated below:
24 T. T. CAI, Y. WANG AND L. ZHANG
Lemma 8.1.2 ([28]). If (x1, x2, · · · , xd) follows a uniform multinomial(`)
distribution, and `d log d  c for some constant c, then for every ζ > 0,
P
(
max
i∈[d]
xi > (rc + ζ) log d
)
= o(1),
where rc is the unique root of 1 + x(log c− log x+ 1)− c = 0 that is strictly
greater than c.
We apply the lemma to obtain that, for any ζ > 0,
P(max
i
mi > (r + ζ) log n) = o(1),
where r is the unique root of 1 + x(log(Cτ/ε) − log x + 1) − (Cτ/ε) = 0
that is greater than Cτ/ε. To see the existence of such a root, note that
fC,τ,ε(x) := 1 + x(log(Cτ/ε) − log x + 1) − (Cτ/ε) is strictly concave and
achieves the global maximum value of 1 at x = Cτ/ε.
It follows from Lemma 8.1.1 that, with high probability, Mk is an (ε(r +
ζ) log n, δeε(r+ζ) logn)-differentially private algorithm. Then we repeat the
lower bound argument in Step 1, the key ingredient of which is showing that
P
(
T R(X˜,Mk(X˜)) 6= ∅
)
is bounded away from 0. First, for every i ∈ [n/k],
P
(
AP (x˜i,Mk(X˜)) = IN
)
≤ eε(r+ζ) lognP
(
AP (x˜i,Mk(X˜ ′i)) = IN
)
+ δeε(r+ζ) logn
≤ 2δeε(r+ζ) logn = 2n−(1+τ)+ε(r+ζ).
By the union bound,
P
(
T R(X˜,Mk(X˜)) 6= ∅
)
≤
∑
i∈[n/k]
P
(
AP (x˜i,Mk(X˜)) = IN
)
≤ 2n−τ+ε(r+ζ).
We claim that this probability is always bounded away from 1, because εr <
τ with appropriately chosen C: since fC,τ,ε(τ/ε) = (τ/ε)(1 + logC −C) + 1
and ε = O(1), for every τ > 0 there is a sufficiently small C > 0 such that
fC,τ,ε(τ/ε) < 0. Since fC,τ,ε(Cτ/ε) = 1 is the global maximum, we have
r < τ/ε, or equivalently εr < τ , as desired.
(2). log
(
1
δ
) (1 + τ) log n: under this setting, we have k = C log( 1nδ )/ε
log n.
Each mi is a sum of n independent Bernoulli(k/n) random variables. We
apply Chernoff inequality: since Emi = k, we have
P(mi ≥ 3k/2) ≤ exp (−k/12) .
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The union bound yields
P(maxmi > 3k/2) ≤
∑
i∈[n/k]
P(mi ≥ 3k/2) ≤ n exp(−k/12) = o(1),
since k  log n.
By Lemma 8.1.1, Mk is a
(
3εk/2, δe3εk/2
)
-differentially private algorithm
with high probability: for every i ∈ [n/k],
P
(
AP (x˜i,Mk(X˜)) = IN
)
≤ e3εk/2P
(
AP (x˜i,Mk(X˜ ′i)) = IN
)
+ δe3εk/2
≤ 2δe3εk/2.
It follows that
P
(
T R(X˜,Mk(X˜)) 6= ∅
)
≤
∑
i∈[n/k]
P
(
AP (x˜i,Mk(X˜)) = IN
)
≤ 2nδe3εk/2.
Choosing k < 23 log(
1
2nδ )/ε guarantees that the probability is bounded away
from 1.
To summarize, in both settings of δ, we have P
(
T R(X˜,Mk(X˜)) 6= ∅
)
bounded away from 1. A similar argument via Markov’s inequality as in Step
1 shows, when n/k . ψ(P, δ), equivalently n . kψ(P, δ)  ψ(P, δ) log(1/δ)/ε,
we have
P(ρ(Mk(X˜),θ(P )) . λ(P, δ))
≤ P({T R(X˜,Mk(X˜)) = ∅} ∩ {ρ(Mk(X˜),θ(P )) . λ(P, δ)})
+ P(T R(X˜,Mk(X˜)) 6= ∅) < 1.
Since Mk(X˜) = M(X) by construction, we have extended the range over
which the lower bound of E[l(ρ(M(X),θ(P ))] ≥ l(λ(P, δ)) is valid by an
extra factor of log(1/δ)/ε.
Step 3: Establishing the lower bound for large n. If n & ψ(P, δ) log(1/δ)/ε,
we can choose 0 < α < 1 such that nα  ψ(P, δ) log(1/δ)/ε. Consider
x1,x2, · · · ,xn independently drawn from the mixture distribution P˜ =
αPθ˜+(1−α)P0 ∈ P, which is assumed to satisfy θ(P˜ ) = θ(αPθ˜+(1−α)P0) =
αθ˜, by our regularity conditions on P and θ.
We then claim that with high probability,
∑n
i=1 1(θ(xi) = θ˜))  nα: by
Chernoff inequality
P
(∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
1(θ(xi) = θ˜))− nα
∣∣∣∣∣ > nα2
)
≤ 2 exp(−nα/10) = o(1).
Let A = {i ∈ [n] : θ(xi) = θ˜}; for every M(X) ≡ M(x1, · · · ,xn), we define
M˜(XA) =
1
αEX[n]\AM(X).
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As ρ is induced by a norm, it must be convex in its first argument: for
every λ ∈ [0, 1],
ρ(λx+ (1− λ)y, a) = ‖λx+ (1− λ)y − a‖
≤ λ‖x− a‖+ (1− λ)‖y − a‖
= λρ(x, a) + (1− λ)ρ(y, a).
By convexity, Jensen’s inequality implies that
E[ρ(M(X),θ(P˜ )] ≥ EXA [ρ(EX[n]/AM(X), αθ˜)] = EXA [ρ(αM˜(XA), αθ˜)]
& αλ(P, δ).
The last inequality follows from the lower bound developed in the pre-
vious steps, since card(A) = Θ(nα) . ψ(P, δ) log(1/δ)/ε. Because nα 
ψ(P, δ) log(1/δ)/ε, we have
E[ρ(M(X),θ(P˜ ))] & αλ(P, δ)  λ(P, δ)ψ(P, δ) log(1/δ)
nε
.
8.2. Proof of Theorem 4.2.
Proof. First, we introduce some useful notation: for a vector v ∈ Rk and
a set S ⊆ [k], let trunc(v,S) denote the vector obtained by setting vi = 0
for i 6∈ S. We also denote n/N0 ≡ n0 for brevity.
Privacy Guarantee: Because of sample splitting, for (x, y) ∈ (X(t),y(t)) for
some 0 ≤ t ≤ N0 − 1, it suffices to prove the privacy guarantee for the
t-th iteration of the algorithm: any iteration prior to the t-th does not de-
pend on (x, y), while any iteration after the t-th is differentially private by
post-processing.
At the t-th iteration, the algorithm first updates the non-sparse estimate
of β:
βˆ(t+0.5) = βˆ(t) − η · 1
n0
(X>(t)fT (X(t)βˆ
(t))−X>(t)fT (y(t)))
We observe that βˆ(t) does not depend on (X(t),y(t)), so the Peeling step
applied to βˆ(t+0.5) would be (ε, δ)-differentially private if it can be shown
that: for every (X˜(t), y˜(t)) obtained by replacing one individual in (X(t),y(t)),
we have∥∥∥(X>(t)fT (X(t)βˆ(t))−X>(t)fT (y(t)))− (X˜>(t)fT (X˜(t)βˆ(t))− X˜>(t)fT (y˜(t)))∥∥∥∞ . T.
This fact is straightforward to show thanks to the `∞ truncations applied
to X(t)βˆ
(t) and y(t). Without the loss of generality, assume that (X˜(t), y˜(t))
and (X(t),y(t)) differ by (x, y) and (x˜, y˜), we calculate:
‖(fT (y)− fT (x>β))x− (fT (y˜)− fT (x˜>β))x˜‖∞ ≤ 2T (‖x‖∞ + ‖x˜‖∞) . T.
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Then the privacy guarantee is proved by Lemma 3.2.4.
Statistical Accuracy : We define
β¯(t+0.5) = βˆ(t) − η ·
(
EX,y
[
1
n0
X>(t)X(t)βˆ
(t)
]
− EX,y
[
1
n0
X>(t)y(t)
])
,
βˆ(t+0.5) = βˆ(t) − η · 1
n0
(
X>(t)fT (X(t)βˆ
(t))−X>(t)fT (y(t))
)
,
β¯(t+1) = trunc(β¯(t+0.5), Sˆ(t+0.5)),
where Sˆ(t+0.5) is the index set selected by applying Peeling to βˆ(t+0.5). Let
β∗ := Ex,y[x>x]−1Ex,y[x>y] be the true parameter. Throughout our calcu-
lations below, we treat βˆ(t) as a deterministic quantity, because it does not
depend on (X(t),y(t)) by the design of our algorithm.
We have
‖βˆ(t+1) − β∗‖2 ≤ ‖βˆ(t+1) − β¯(t+1)‖2 + ‖β¯(t+1) − β∗‖2.
We shall provide upper bounds for the two terms on the right hand side
separately.
For ‖βˆ(t+1) − β¯(t+1)‖2, let W denote the vector of Laplace noises of
|Sˆ(t+0.5)| = sˆ dimensions that is generated when the Peeling algorithm out-
puts the noisy top sˆ coordinates of βˆ(t+0.5), we have
E‖βˆ(t+1) − β¯(t+1)‖2
≤ E‖trunc(βˆ(t+0.5), Sˆ(t+0.5))− trunc(β¯(t+0.5), Sˆ(t+0.5))‖2 + ‖W ‖2
.
√
sˆE‖βˆ(t+0.5) − β¯(t+0.5)‖∞ +
√
sˆE‖W ‖∞
.
√
sˆE‖βˆ(t+0.5) − β¯(t+0.5)‖∞ +
√
sˆ · T
n0
·
(
ε√
sˆ log(1/δ)
)−1
· log d
.
√
sˆE‖βˆ(t+0.5) − β¯(t+0.5)‖∞ + Ts
√
log(1/δ)
n0ε
log d.
E‖βˆ(t+0.5) − β¯(t+0.5)‖∞ is controlled by the following lemma.
Lemma 8.2.1. Under the same conditions as
E‖βˆ(t+0.5) − β¯(t+0.5)‖∞ . σ
√
log d
n0
,(8.1)
Lemma 8.2.1 implies that
E‖βˆ(t+1) − β¯(t+1)‖2 . σ
√
s log d
n0
+
T
√
s log(1/δ)
n0ε
log d.(8.2)
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The next step is bounding ‖β¯(t+1) − β∗‖2. We begin with introducing
constants µ = 2λmax(ΣX), ν = 2λmin(ΣX), such that:
ν/2 · ‖β1 − β2‖2 ≤ EX,y
[
(β1 − β2)> 1
n
X>X(β1 − β2)
]
≤ µ/2 · ‖β1 − β2‖2
By invoking standard optimization results for minimizing strongly convex
and smooth objective functions, e.g., in Nesterov (2004), for stepsize η =
2/(ν + µ),
(8.3) ‖β¯(t+0.5) − β∗‖2 ≤ (µ− ν
µ+ ν
) · ‖βˆ(t) − β∗‖2.
Then we use the Lemma 5.1 from [36].
Lemma 8.2.2. Suppose that we have
‖β¯(t+0.5) − β∗‖2 ≤ κ · ‖β∗‖2,
for some κ ∈ (0, 1). Assuming that we have
sˆ ≥ 4(1 + κ)
2
(1− κ)2 s, and
√
sˆ‖βˆ(t+0.5) − β¯(t+0.5)‖∞ ≤ (1− κ)
2
2(1 + κ)
· ‖β∗‖2,
then it holds that
‖β¯(t+1)−β∗‖2 ≤ C
√
s√
1− κ‖βˆ
(t+0.5)−β¯(t+0.5)‖∞+(1+4
√
s/sˆ)1/2·‖β¯(t+0.5)−β∗‖2.
The lemma enables us to establish the following result:
Lemma 8.2.3. For t = −1, 0, 1, 2, ...n0 − 1 and ρ := µ−νµ+ν , it holds with
high probability that
‖βˆ(t+1) − β∗‖2 ≤ κ‖β∗‖2,
‖β¯(t+1) − β∗‖2 ≤ ρt/2‖βˆ(0) − β∗‖2 + C
(
σ
√
s log d
n0
+
Ts
√
log(1/δ)
n0ε
log d
)
.
(8.4)
Finally, with t  log n (namely n0  n/ log n), T  σ
√
log n, (8.2) and
(8.4) together imply the desired upper bound.
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8.2.1. Proof of Lemma 8.2.1.
Proof.
E‖βˆ(t+0.5) − β¯(t+0.5)‖∞
=
1
n0
E
∥∥∥(EX,y [X>(t)X(t)βˆ(t) −X>(t)y(t)])− (X>(t)fT (X(t)βˆ(t))−X>(t)fT (y(t)))∥∥∥∞
≤ E
∥∥∥∥(EX,y [ 1n0X>(t)X(t)βˆ(t) − 1n0X>(t)y(t)
])
− 1
n0
(
X>(t)X(t)βˆ
(t) −X>(t)y(t)
)∥∥∥∥
∞
+ E
∥∥∥∥ 1n0
(
X>(t)X(t)βˆ
(t) −X>(t)y(t)
)
− 1
n0
(
X>(t)fT (X(t)βˆ
(t))−X>(t)fT (y(t))
)∥∥∥∥
∞
.
The first term is at most the order of σ
√
log d
n0
, as follows:
E
∥∥∥∥(EX,y [ 1n0X>(t)X(t)βˆ(t) − 1n0X>(t)y(t)
])
− 1
n0
(
X>(t)X(t)βˆ
(t) −X>(t)y(t)
)∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ E
∥∥∥∥ 1nT X>(t)y(t) − EX,y
[
1
n0
X>(t)y(t)
]∥∥∥∥
∞
+ E
∥∥∥∥EX,y [ 1n0 (X>(t)X(t))βˆ(t)
]
− 1
n0
(X>(t)X(t))βˆ
(t)
∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ E
∥∥∥∥ 1n0X>(t)(X(t)β∗ + )− EX,y
[
1
n0
X>(t)(X(t)β
∗ + )
]∥∥∥∥
∞
+ E
∥∥∥∥EX,y [ 1n0 (X>(t)X(t))βˆ(t)
]
− 1
n0
(X>(t)X(t))βˆ
(t)
∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ E
∥∥∥∥EX,y [ 1n0 (X>(t)X(t))βˆ(t)
]
− 1
n0
(X>(t)X(t))βˆ
(t)
∥∥∥∥
∞
+ E
∥∥∥∥( 1n0X>(t)X(t) − E
[
1
n0
X>(t)X(t)
])
β∗
∥∥∥∥
∞
+ E
∥∥∥∥ 1n0X>(t)− EX,y
[
1
n0
X>(t)
]∥∥∥∥
∞
.
For the first two terms, we note that for a fixed vector a ∈ Rd and X
consisting of sub-Gaussian entries, by the standard Bernstein-type inequality
for sub-exponential random variables, we have
E
∥∥∥∥ΣXa− 1n(X>X)a
∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ E
(
max
j
1
n
n∑
i=1
zijz
>
i a
)
. σ
√
log d
n
,
where zij denotes the centered version of xij . Similarly, by our assumption
that  := y−x>β∗ is subgaussian, the same bound holds for the third term
E
∥∥∥ 1n0X>(t)− EX,y [ 1n0X>(t)]∥∥∥∞ as well. So we obtain
1
n0
E
∥∥∥(EX,y [X>(t)X(t)βˆ(t) −X>(t)y(t)])− (X>(t)X(t)βˆ(t) −X>(t)y(t))∥∥∥∞ . σ
√
log d
n0
.
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Finally, it remains to bound
E
∥∥∥∥ 1n0
(
X>(t)X(t)βˆ
(t) −X>(t)y(t)
)
− 1
n0
(
X>(t)fT (X(t)βˆ
(t))−X>(t)fT (y(t))
)∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ 1
n0
E‖X>(t)(X(t)βˆ(t) − fT (X(t)βˆ(t)))‖∞ +
1
n0
E‖X>(t)(y(t) − fT (y(t)))‖∞
In general, for an n0-dimensional sub-Gaussian(σ) random vector z satisfy-
ing ‖Ez‖∞ = O(1), since |xij | ≤ 1, we have
E‖X>(t)(z − fT (z))‖∞ ≤
n0∑
i=1
E [|zi|1(|zi > T )] .
For each i ∈ [n0], since ‖Ez‖∞ = O(1), for sufficiently large constant K,
P(|zi| > t)dt ≤ Ke−t2/(2σ2).
Hence,
E [zi1 (|zi| > T )] ≤
∫ ∞
T
P(|zi| > t)dt ≤
∫ ∞
T
Ke−t
2/σ2dt.
At last, by a standard tail estimate of the Gaussian integral, with T >
σ
√
2 log n, ∫ ∞
T
Ke−t
2/σ2dt . e−T 2/σ2 . 1
n0
.
It then follows that
1
n0
E‖X>(t)(z − fT (z))‖∞ ≤
1
n0
n0∑
i=1
E [|zi|1(|zi > T )] . 1
n0
,
which is negligible compared to the σ
√
log d
n0
terms above.
8.2.2. Proof of Lemma 8.2.3.
Proof. In this proof, C refers to a numerical constant that may take
different values in different contexts.
We prove the lemma by induction. When t = −1, the two inequalities
trivially hold. In particular, the first inequality is exactly our condition on
the initialization of the algorithm.
For the inductive step, we suppose that with high probability,
‖βˆ(t) − β∗‖2 ≤ κ‖β∗‖2,
‖β¯(t) − β∗‖2 ≤ ρ(t−1)/2‖βˆ(0) − β∗‖2 + C
(
σ
√
s log d
n0
+
Ts
√
log(1/δ)
n0ε
log d
)
.
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The goal is to prove these statements with t replaced by t+ 1.
To apply Lemma 8.2.2, we shall first verify that its conditions are satisfied.
We have,
‖β¯(t+0.5) − β∗‖2 ≤ ρ‖βˆ(t) − β∗‖2 ≤ ρκ · ‖β∗‖2 ≤ κ‖β∗‖2.
The first inequality is due to (8.3); the second equality is due to our inductive
hypothesis. The condition on sˆ in Lemma 8.2.2 is satisfied by our choice of
the tuning parameter, while the third condition
√
sˆ‖βˆ(t+0.5) − β¯(t+0.5)‖∞ ≤ (1− κ)
2
2(1 + κ)
· ‖β∗‖2
holds with high probability, thanks to Lemma 8.2.1.
Then, we use Lemma 8.2.2 and (8.3) to obtain that
‖β¯(t+1) − β∗‖2
≤ C
√
s√
1− κ‖βˆ
(t+0.5) − β¯(t+0.5)‖∞ + (1 + 4
√
s/sˆ)1/2 · ‖β¯(t+0.5) − β∗‖2
≤ C
(
σ
√
s log d
n0
+
Ts
√
log(1/δ)
(n0)ε
log d
)
+ (1 + 4
√
s/sˆ)1/2 · ρ‖βˆ(t) − β∗‖2,
where the last inequality makes use of (8.1) and (8.3).
When (1 + 4
√
s/sˆ)1/2 < ρ−1/2, that is, sˆ > ( 4ρ1−ρ)
2s, we have
‖β¯(t+1) − β∗‖2 ≤ ρ1/2‖βˆ(t) − β∗‖2 + C
(
σ
√
s log d
n0
+
Ts
√
log(1/δ)
n0ε
log d
)
.
It follows that
‖β¯(t+1) − β∗‖2
≤ ρ1/2‖βˆ(t) − β∗‖2 + C
(
σ
√
s log d
n0
+
Ts
√
log(1/δ)
n0ε
log d
)
≤ ρ1/2
(
‖βˆ(t) − β¯(t)‖2 + ‖β¯(t) − β∗‖2
)
+ C
(
σ
√
s log d
n0
+
Ts
√
log(1/δ)
n0ε
log d
)
≤ ρt/2‖βˆ(0) − β∗‖2 + C
(
σ
√
s log d
n0
+
Ts
√
log(1/δ)
n0ε
log d
)
.
The last inequality is a consequence of the inductive hypothesis and (8.2).
32 T. T. CAI, Y. WANG AND L. ZHANG
To complete the induction, the inequality above and (8.2) imply that
‖βˆ(t+1) − β∗‖2 ≤ E‖βˆ(t+1) − β¯(t+1)‖2 + ‖β¯(t+1) − β∗‖2
≤ ρt/2‖βˆ(0) − β∗‖2 + C
(
σ
√
s log d
n0
+
Ts
√
log(1/δ)
n0ε
log d
)
≤ ρt/2κ‖β∗‖2 + C
(
σ
√
s log d
n0
+
Ts
√
log(1/δ)
n0ε
log d
)
≤ κ‖β∗‖2.
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